BACKGROUND ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE

The inception of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine goes to the formation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000 under the authority of the Canadian Government. The purpose of the commission was to redefine collective security by introducing the concept of shared responsibility. The ICISS Report stated that when a state’s legitimacy is in question, in terms of its commitment to the protection of its citizens, the international community must intervene for the humanitarian purposes.1

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine argues that states have the primary Responsibility to Protect their citizens from heinous crimes, genocides, and ethnic cleansing. However, if states fail to protect their citizens against human rights violations, then the international community is justified in using collective force through the United Nations Security Council as a last resort after all diplomatic means fail (e.g., sanctions, mediation, prosecution by the International Criminal Court). The doctrine also states that there are six criteria justifying military intervention: presence of just cause and right intention; force being used as a last resort and in proportional means; the intervention having reasonable prospects such as a reasonable chance of success; and force being used by the right authority, which in this case is the UN.2

The report released by the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in 2004 stressed that global interconnectedness brought along certain threats to international peace and security, which required nations to work together in order to address challenges. Furthermore, the report argued for strengthening the UN in order for it to provide collective security more effectively. The report set basic criteria defining the goals set for the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Its goals were: emphasizing development of countries to eradicate poverty; building public health capacity through biological security; responding to threats with a strategy of prevent and respond; using force only as a last resort with the existence of a commonly agreed upon criteria; articulating an effective counter-terrorism strategy in harmony with human rights; creating incentives for states to forego their nuclear activities; making structural changes within the UN (e.g. reforming the UN Security Council); focusing on post-conflict peace building by establishing a “Peace Building Commission;” and initiating certain changes to the Commission on Human Rights and strengthening the Secretariat.3

The Responsibility to Protect doctrines became officially recognized with the 2005 World Summit. Summit Leaders reached an agreement and endorsed this particular doctrine. This endorsement was later followed by Resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and later reaffirmed in 2009 with Resolution 1894, which recognized that states had a Responsibility to Protect their citizens under the provisions of Responsibility to Protect, stated within paragraphs 138 and 139.4 The World Summit Outcome reads:

Each and individual State has the “Responsibility to Protect” its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the “Responsibility to Protect” populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those that are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

The first comprehensive report on the Responsibility to Protect appeared in 2009, and was released by the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon. The report took the 2005 commitment further by supporting a three-pillar approach including the protection of state responsibilities, international cooperative action, and decisive and timely response of the international community in halting the human rights crises. The 2010 Report of Secretary Ban Ki-Moon later emphasized the further development of the 2009 Report and the improvement of the doctrine.5

A NEW PARADIGM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In their article, Richard Cooper and Juliette Kohler see Responsibility to Protect as a means to promote empathy and compassion.6 Responsibility to Protect creates a global social contract, which recognizes states’ sovereignty and the international community’s duty to respect states’ internal affairs. However, this doctrine also makes clear that the international community can no longer afford to witness the human rights violations in some countries. This justifies taking action against those outrageous crimes whereby the states lose their legitimacy. The authors see the global social contract as the expansion of human rights law, legitimized with the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. This doctrine includes certain steps such as responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild, thus ongoing engagement to prevent conflict. Furthermore, the authors use this doctrine within the context of the United States. They reference historical examples from the US such as the abolition of slavery. The abolition of slavery is similar to the Responsibility to Protect in that they both indicate that even the most unthinkable is possible by defining moments that change the course of history. These moments bring humanity to higher levels of civilization with global efforts and recognize that prohibition is not only sufficient, but also that there is a greater need for implementation and enforcement of rules. The authors perceive a new leadership role for the US under the Responsibility to Protect since a stable world community would be in its national interest. With respect to this, the US should restore American leadership in human rights violation prevention by using the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.

Looking at the 1990s, it is evident that the international community has insufficiently responded to human rights violations in certain countries. Evans and Sahnoun review the humanitarian intervention principles and come up with a new definition for the Responsibility to Protect.7 According to them, intervention should be seen as protection, rather than pure right to intervene. The authors made clear that the UN failed to use the authority of international community in the 1990s and take action against the atrocities in Kosovo. Not to repeat those mistakes of the past, the institutional framework behind the Responsibility to Protect should be strengthened. As it is mentioned in the article, solving the inconsistencies within the UN Security Council would be the best place to start, since it is the core for military intervention decisions. There needs to be a stronger mechanism within the UN Security Council that would be able to apply the intervention principles more effectively.

Achiume makes a careful analysis of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect and applies it to the ongoing conflict in Syria.8 The concept of “Responsibility to Protect” provides a more equitable distribution of refugees by obligating the international community to take action, thus keeping the burden away from Lebanon and Turkey, which host most of the Syrian refugees. With this doctrine, other countries would feel obligated to intervene in order to provide humanitarian aid and thus cooperate with Lebanon and Turkey in order to share their burden of Syrian refugees. Even though international refugee law imposes no obligation on third party actors to provide assistance to states that host refugees, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine fills this gap and encourages international responsibility. Furthermore, this doctrine makes an emphasis on international engagement with sovereignty failures, and thus establishes itself as a significant force for the protection of human rights. Looking at the conflict in Syria, one can clearly see the operationalization of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in terms of the international community’s support for both the refugees and refugee hosting countries.

University of California’s Human Rights Center Report applies the Responsibility to Protect doctrine to the context of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan.9 In the case of Darfur, actions taken by the UN have been ineffective and the organization has been facing difficulties in operationalizing its post-Rwanda commitments. The international community should go beyond mere rhetoric inspired by its failure to halt the Rwandan genocide, and it should take action. However, the main question here is whether the Responsibility to Protect doctrine can be converted from principle into practice. The report makes certain recommendations in this context. Advocates for Responsibility to Protect should work to create a new paradigm for encouraging the international community to prevent and rebuild after mass atrocities. Furthermore, there needs to be a coordinated international educational campaign, which would publicize the objectives of the doctrine. High level advocates and international NGOs would be the best actors that would help promote the doctrine and mobilize grassroot support.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE

Although it has not been long since the UN General Assembly endorsed the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, it has already become an organizing principle for global peace and security. Stahn emphasizes the doctrine’s ambiguities given the fact that different actors interpret it differently.10 Furthermore, Responsibility to Protect fails to be a legal norm because it does not always succeed in promoting the collective action of states supporting humanitarian interventions. The author uses reports from the ICSSI, the High Level Panel, and the Secretary General’s Outcome Document from the 2005 World Summit to support his claims. These reports make it clear that the politically and legally undesirable right of intervention has been shifted to humanitarian intervention under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, however, from the legal point of view there is no significant difference betweens both kinds of humanitarian interventions. The UN Secretary General’s report, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All,” and the High Level Panel report, presented at the 2005 World Summit, show according the author that there has been a general international reluctance to carry out military action without the UN Security Council’s authorization. The international divisions surrounding this issue are the biggest impediment to the application of the doctrine as a legal norm. Therefore, it can be said that Responsibility to Protect is more of a political principle than international norm, as it was intended to be. There is need for cooperative state action and further commitment to the humanitarian crises in order to make the doctrine an international principle.

Weiss accepts the Responsibility to Protect as an essential framework for military intervention.11 However, he focuses on the shortcomings in the ICISS’ approach to Responsibility to Protect. ICISS takes states’ sovereignty into consideration and stresses that states should be the primary actors in solving humanitarian crises within their borders. If they fail to do so, then the international community has the right to intervene. Weiss’ problem with ICISS comes from the international intervention. He highlights that the Responsibility to Protect doctrine can be used by states to enhance their national interests rather than humanitarian help (i.e. the doctrine can be used to make it appear that non-humanitarian intervention is really humanitarian intervention). Furthermore, most failed states cannot protect their citizens against human rights violations and it is only the democratic states that have both the authority and monopoly of force. The author mostly focuses on the role of the US in affecting the international community’s decisions about foreign interventions. He analyzes the American unilateral intervention in Iraq and within the context of Responsibility to Protect. He reaches the conclusion that the US uses the UN to pursue its national interests, even though it keeps using multilateral rhetoric. Consequently, the author reinforces the necessity of US dominance within the UN since the UN would not be able to flourish without American presence.

Karns and Mingst examine the US dominance within the UN from a different perspective.12 They assert that the American relationship with the UN has never been stable and depended more upon domestic factors than international. Even though the US was a staunch supporter of the UN after World War II and used it as a main instrument of its foreign policy, its devotion to multilateralism faded away after 1970s with changing domestic politics. One domestic factor was fluctuating presidential views about multilateral agreements. For example, there was a crisis of multilateralism during Reagan’s presidency, which showed that domestic actors such as Congress, the executive branch, public opinion, and NGOs responded to issues concerning the UN in different ways. The divergence negatively affected the American leadership role in the organization. In the end, the authors make it clear that the United States continues to play an important leadership role within the UN since it is still the largest contributor of funds. However, the US cannot strengthen its leadership without strong support, which comes from having stable domestic politics. In short, the authors come to the conclusion that domestic factors are what will decide the American role in the UN in the future.

Hamilton focuses on three challenges for Responsibility to Protect that threaten its implementation: lack of political will, authorization, and operational capacity.13 In order to build political will, there should be a coalition that would lobby for the implementation of the doctrine. The issue of authorization can be resolved by initiating certain reforms within the UN itself. These reforms can start by modifying the veto system within the UN Security Council for cases involving humanitarian crises. However, in order to initiate these reforms at the international level, there is a need for political will at the domestic level. Operational capacity also depends on political will and people’s willingness to commit to the implementation of Responsibility to Protect. Furthermore, Hamilton emphasizes the improvement of rapid reaction capabilities of regional forces. By analyzing these three challenges he concludes that even though the doctrine has its shortcomings, it is certainly a strong promise to people who experience human rights violations. In order to make the doctrine an international norm there is a need for political will for the implementation of reforms.

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine has been taken center stage in international debates about preventing mass atrocities. In this regard, Bellamy’s article analyzes the evolution of the doctrine over the past five years.14 The article focuses mainly on three questions and tries to answer them: what is the real function of the doctrine? What kind of model does it propose in the international arena? How did it contribute to the prevention of human rights violations so far? Bellamy sees the doctrine as both policy agenda and rhetoric that can be used in order to promote international intervention in the case of humanitarian crisis. For the second question, Responsibility to Protect offers a model for states’ responsibilities to ensure the well-being of its citizens and respect for international norms. The author adopts a skeptical approach when addressing the third question. He makes clear that Responsibility to Protect has not been very effective in practice and has failed to prevent humanitarian crises. However, the article reminds us that the doctrine has been fairly successful as a diplomatic tool and in rhetoric.

Ayoob analyzes the fault lines within international human rights protection.15 One of the contradictions in the international intervention is that the international community might choose certain places for intervention, while ignoring other places with the same humanitarian crises. In this way, the community has double standards and this makes the Responsibility to Protect doctrine ineffective. Another shortcoming is that violation of state sovereignty may threaten the international order in the long run, since this would be contrary to the principle of non-intervention. Ayoob uses this in the context of international intervention decisions that are undertaken regardless of the UN veto provisions. Furthermore, international interventions might be seen as colonial dominations and used in order to promote the interests of the interventionist powers. In conclusion, Ayoob recommends western nations to face their history and remember that they once were among the human rights violators. In this way, the power to determine where human rights have been violated should be less concentrated in the hands of the western powers. Thus, there is a need for equal dispersion of power among the members of the international community.

Luck explores different interpretations of sovereignty and how they are used in the context of Responsibility to Protect both by developing and developed nations.16 Both sides are reluctant to give their sovereignty away even if this is for the prevention of mass atrocities. Whereas developing nations are more concerned about territorial sovereignty, developed nations are concerned about their decision-making sovereignty. These concerns, as stated in the 2005 World Summit, create obstacles for the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. However, these concerns also unite developing and developed nations on the grounds that they both want to preserve their national sovereignty and this can at the same time help them achieve consensus on the implementation of Responsibility to Protect.

EXAMINING TURKEY’S APPROACH TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE IN THE CASE OF SYRIA

Turkey has certainly been one of the countries that has been most affected by the Syrian Conflict since its beginning in 2011. Even though the Turkish government tried to act as a mediator between the rebels and the Assad government at the initial stage of conflict, the Assad govern ment’s oppressive actions against civilians turned a once Assad-friendly Turkish government into one of it loudest critics.17 The Turkish government since then has been channeling weapons and other equipment to the Free Syrian Army as well as sheltering many Syrian refugees and opposition activists.18 In this case, it can be said that the Syrian conflict has spilled over to Turkey.19

When the conflict first started, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu flew to Syria to deliver a final ultimatum; however, as the Assad government intensified its assaults on the civilian population, the Foreign Minister clearly stated that Turkey would not remain indifferent to continuing massacres by the regime in Syria.20 Furthermore, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, called on the Assad government to step down in order to achieve peace in the region:

Without spilling any more blood, without causing any more injustice, for the sake of peace for the people, the country and the region, finally step down. We do not have eyes on any country’s land; we have no desire to interfere in any country’s internal affairs. But when person is persecuted, especially a people that are our relatives, our brothers, and with whom we share a 910 km border, we absolutely cannot pretend nothing is happening and turn our backs.

The Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, also stated that Syria was at a dead end; however, this would never justify external intervention. In this way, Turkey made it clear that it only stood for the welfare of Syrian citizens and was against outside intervention.21

Tensions grew over the downing of a Turkish jet by the Syrian military in June 2012.22 Even though Turkey claimed that it was merely testing its radar systems, Syria insisted that the Turkish jet was within Syrian airspace to conduct surveillance. After the downing the Turkish Prime Minister stated that:

Every military element approaching Turkey from the Syrian border and representing a security risk and danger will be assessed as a military threat and will be treated as a military target.

In this way, the Prime Minister openly threatened the Syrian government with military retaliation if there were to be any further violation of Turkish airspace. Even though Turkey opposed the collective action against Syria at the initial stages of the conflict, its stance has changed after the shooting of the jet. Turkey called an emergency meeting in Brussels in order to invoke Article Five of North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an attack against any member country is an attack against all, which also parallels the responsibility protect principle since they both support collective action. However, NATO Secretary, General Rasmussen, made it clear that NATO was not willing to take collective action against Syria even though it stood together with Turkey in a spirit of solidarity.23 As a bomb fell in a town of Turkish border and killed five civilians in October 2012, the Prime Minister toughened his rhetoric against Syria even more. He said:

What did our forefathers say? ‘If you want peace, prepare for war.

In the context of Turkish culture, this line is crucial because it refers back to Turkish Independence from Britain after World War I. The Turks fought hard for their independence from the British mandate and they earned peace as a result. This line indicates the same relationship in the context of Syria by stating simply that Turkey is ready for war with Syria if that war will result in regional peace.

The Turkish government slowly transformed its soft power against Syria into hard power by placing a ban on all Syrian aircrafts in the country’s airspace and grounding a Syrian passenger plane coming from Russia. All of these showed that Turkey was getting very close to sending troops into Syria in order to depose the Assad government. The Prime Minister even stated that “massacres in Syria that gain strength from the international community’s indifference are continuing to increase and Syria has become a terrorist state.”24 However, as NATO showed little interest into in collective action against Syria, Turkey backed down, and was certainly not willing to take action on its own.25

The ongoing conflict within Syria also raised questions about Turkey’s support for certain radical groups within the opposition. Turkey got many criticisms from various international actors for turning a blind eye to jihadist groups, such as Al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra entering into Syria via Turkey. Upon this, the Turkish government made statements denying their support for the jihadist groups.26 The Turkish Foreign Minister expressed that:

We have said this over and over, both I and the prime minister. Turkey has no relations with any radical group in Syria, and I am especially referring to Jabhat al-Nusra. This accusation is ugly propaganda on the part of those who want to overshadow Turkey’s humanitarian policy in Syria.

Even though the Turkish government still believes that the most important thing to accomplish in Syria is the end of Assad, it cannot guarantee that the country will not fall into Islamist extremism after Assad and it is unquestionably aware of the possibility of a Syrian fracture. At this stage, Turkey’s policy of strong support of rebels has failed and also led to the empowerment of the rebels who are linked to terrorist organizations. Upon Turkey’s support of rebel groups, Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, stated, “Turkey will pay a heavy price for supporting terrorists.”27

Turkey’s most recent statements about the conflict in Syria were about the regime’s use of chemical weapons on civilians, which was defined as a red line previously by the Obama administration. As Russia proposed that the Syrian regime hand over its chemical weapons to the international community, Turkish President, Gul, stated that:

We already knew that there was a great amount of chemical weapons in one of our neighboring countries. So cleansing Syria of chemical weapons is a significant development. One should be grateful for this. But this should not become a tactic; it should be a real cleansing. The second dimension to this is that the issue is not solely about chemical weapons. There is a country here where over 100,000 people have been killed, where a cruel civil war reigns, where people’s cities are destroyed. This must be stopped. There has to be a political strategy as a way out. Otherwise, no one can accept things going as they are. There is a need for a political exit strategy to form a new strategy that can end the war and allow people to live in their own country. It is very saddening that this hasn’t been brought forth yet.

By this statement, Turkey expressed its relief about Syria’s coming to terms with the international community on the matter of chemical weapons; however, the government reiterated its purpose of bringing peace to Syria, which can only be attained by the end of the Assad regime.28

In this case, the situation in Syria remains uncertain, and Turkey, a country that has been involved in the conflict since its beginning, cannot offer any alternative solution to this dilemma. Turkey’s discourse has changed quite a bit since the conflict first started. The Turkish government’s first strategy was to act as a mediator in order to persuade its old friend to come to terms with the international community and respect human rights. As the Syrian government ignored Turkey’s warning, Turkey embraced a more aggressive strategy by supporting the rebels, which comprise of multiple terrorist groups, the most notorious one being al-Nusra. Furthermore, Turkey pressured the international community to take action against the Assad regime and asked NATO to invoke Article Five. As Turkey’s calls for an international response have been useless, especially with the recent settlement on handing over chemical weapons, Turkey decided to continue with its rhetoric against the Syrian regime and continue to take the burden of over 600,000 Syrian refugees in its border towns.29

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT WITHIN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

According to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, Syria has the obligation to protect its citizens against human rights violations. However, in this case it is the Syrian state that is causing the humanitarian crisis. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine authorizes international action if the state fails to protect its citizens against human rights violations and in this respect, the UN and EU have already exercised diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Assad regime, which signified that the Responsibility to Protect was alive. However, these sanctions proved to be insufficient to avert the violence. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine also authorizes the use of force by the international community as a last resort. Even though Syria long ago lost its sovereign immunity to external interference, the international community is unwilling to intervene into the country since the UN Security Council has been experiencing structural problems, which are related to voting and national interests. In this context, the doctrine has undoubtedly been ineffective in Syria compared to Libya. With different circumstances in Syria (e.g. geopolitical setting, sectarian divisions as well as Russia and Iran’s commitment to the Assad regime), the Responsibility to Protect is mission impossible.30

CONCLUSION

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine has been one of the most influential human rights doctrines in recent years. This doctrine legitimizes external intervention by favoring human rights over states’ sovereignty. It also puts forward three core principles, which are the responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild. By going through the three step analysis, this doctrine reminds us that states hold the primary Responsibility to Protect their citizens against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and humanitarian crisis. The international community’s primary mission in this respect should be to assist states in protecting their citizens. However, if the state lacks this ability or the state is the one that commits the heinous crimes, then it should be the international community’s responsibility to prevent mass atrocities, first by diplomatic means, and as a last resort by force. However, it is fairly obvious that Responsibility to Protect did not really work as was intended. Its drawbacks, such as the inefficiency of the UN Security Council, which is the main decision making body within the organization regarding international crisis, led to stalemates within the international system.

This study has aimed to examine the manner in which a neighboring country such as Turkey could use the Responsibility to Protect principle to protect civilians in the Syrian conflict. It starts out by analyzing the doctrine and its evolution since its inception as well as discussing different studies about the doctrine. The study applies the Responsibility to Protect doctrine to the Syrian civil war as well and points out the failure of the international community to respond to the crisis. Furthermore, it investigates what Turkey has done to help to end the humanitarian crisis within Syria. In this respect, it emphasizes the absence of collective response by showing that Turkey has been one of the neighboring countries that had to undertake the burden.

This study tries to expand the concept of Responsibility to Protect by looking at the current literature on the subject. The current literature mostly focuses on the Responsibility to Protect doctrine’s rising popularity as a political principle as well as analyzing the shortcomings of international organizations with respect to the application of intervention principles. The scholars mostly side with reforms within the international system in order to strengthen the principle and make it more applicable in terms of humanitarian intervention. This study evaluates the doctrine by looking at its operationalization within the context of Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian conflict as well as pointing out certain drawbacks in the international community’s response to the conflict under the particular doctrine. This doctrine can be further analyzed as the conflict in Syria continues. In this way, the doctrine’s functionality can be better examined in the future as the Syrian conflict comes to an end and thus, enables lessons to be drawn from it.

NOTES

1International Development Research Center, Report of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “Responsibility to Protect,” Dec. 2011.
2Stand, “Responsibility to Protect,” Nov. 2013, [http://www.standnow.org/learn/responsibility](http://www.standnow.org/learn/responsibility)
3United Nations, Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 2004. A More Secured World: A Shared Responsibility.
4United Nations, General Assembly. 21 Mar. 2005. “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” report of the Secretary General. Also see the Appendix Section.
5United Nations, General Assembly. 12 Jan. 2009. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, report of the Secretary General.
6Cooper, Richard H. and Juliette V. Kohler, Responsibility to Protect: The New Global Moral Compact, Palgrave Macmillan (2009).
7Evans, Gareth and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs (2002).
8Achiume, Tendayi, “A Different Responsibility to Protect,” University of California, School of Law (2013).
9Human Rights Center, Religion, Politics and Globalization Program, “The Responsibility to Protect: Moving the Campaign Forward,” University of California (2007).
10Stahn, Carsten, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?” The American Journal of International Law (2007).
11Weiss, Thomas G. “The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era.” The Graduate Center, The City University of New York (2004).
12Karns, Margaret and Karen Mingst, “The Past as Prologue: The United States and the Future of the UN System.” United Nations University (1995).
13Hamilton, Rebecca, “Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine: But What of Implementation?,” Harvard Human Rights Journal (2006).
14Bellamy, Alex, “The Responsibility to Protect- Five Years On,” Ethics and International Affairs (2010).
15Ayoob, Mohammed, “Humanitarian Intervention and International Society,” Global Governance (2001).
16Luck, Edward C., “Sovereignty, Choice and the Responsibility to Protect,” Global Responsibility to Protect (2009).
17Aras, Damla, “Turkish-Syrian Relations Go Downhill,” The Middle East Quarterly (2012). Retrieved 22 Dec. 2013.
18Stack, Liam, “In Slap at Syria, Turkey Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters,” The New York Times 27 Oct. 2011. Retrieved on 22 Dec. 2013.
19Gillis Clare M. “In Turkey, Anger as Syrian Conflict Spills Over,” USA Today 19 May 2013. Retrieved on 22 Dec. 2013.
20The Economist, “One Problem with a Neighbor,” 20 Aug. 2011. Retrieved on 28 Nov. 2013.
21Burch, Jonathon, “Turkish Prime Minister Tells Syria’s Assad to Step Down,” CS Monitor 22 Nov. 2011. Retrieved on 28 Nov. 2013.
22Turgut, Pelin, “Military Intervention Still Unlikely After Syria Shoots Down Turkish Jet,” Time 25 Jun. 2012. Retrieved on 28 Nov. 2013.
23Black, Ian and Julian Borger, “Turkey Threatens Syria with Military Retaliation over Downed Jet,” The Guardian 26 Jun. 2012. Retrieved on 28 Nov. 2013.
24Aydinli, Pinar and Jonathon Burch, “Turkish Prime Minister says Syria has become a Terrorist State,” Reuters 5 Sept. 2012. Retrieved on 28 Nov. 2013.
25Hansen, Suzy, “Turkey’s Prime Minister Wants War in Syria. Turks Don’t,” New Republic 18 Oct. 2012. Retrieved on 28 Nov. 2013.
26Daloglu, Tulin, “Is Turkey Digging a Hole with its Syria Policy,” Al Monitor 16 Oct. 2013. Retrieved on 28 Nov. 2013.
27Browder, Jayson, “Caught in the Crossfire: Turkey and Syria,” Foreign Policy Journal 27 Nov. 2013. Retrieved on 29 Nov. 2013.
28“Syrian Crisis isn’t just about Chemicals, says Turkish President,” Hurriyet, Daily News, 11 Sept. 2013. Retrieved on 29 Nov. 2013.
29Pamuk, Humeyra, “Number of Syrian Refugees in Turkey exceeds 600,000: Turkish Official,” Reuters 21 Oct. 2013. Retrieved on 29 Nov. 2013.
30Ramberg, Bennett, “Applying Responsibility to Protect Syria,” Yale Global 5 Mar. 2012. Retrieved on 29 Nov. 2013.

APPENDIX

138 Each individual State has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139 The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the Responsibility to Protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those, which are under stress before crises, and conflicts break out.

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Korkmaz is a first year graduate student from Ankara, Turkey. She wrote this research paper when she was a senior pursuing B.A. in Political Science with a minor in History. She is currently working at a financial advisory company specialized in healthcare industry in Istanbul and working towards her M.A. in International Relations. She plans to come back to the US next year for her graduate studies and hope to work for the US Department of State in the future.

She would like to thank Dr. Adriana Seagle for her support and guidance throughout this project.